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Military and Energy

Security Situation Around the Black Sea Area

von Eugene Kogan

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Eugene Kogan

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Contents

Military and Energy	
Security Situation Around the Black Sea Area	3
Key Points	4
Introduction	4
Two Heavyweights: Russia and Turkey and the Montreux Conundrum	6
Challenges Ahead	8
Energy Security	9
Conclusion	10
Notes	11
Bibliography	16
Abbreviations and Acronyms	18
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Bisher erschienen	19



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Dr. Eugene KOGAN studierte an der Universität Tel Aviv Geschichte und promovierte an der Universität Warwick, Großbritannien. Seine Dissertation beschäftigte sich mit der Auslagerung der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie aus der Kriegszone im Lauf der Jahre 1941-1942.

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
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Military and Energy Security Situation Around the Black Sea Area

The security situation round the Black Sea area can be described in the following words:

Small sparks could start large fires or as it written in the Russian proverb *v tikhom omute cherty vodyatsya*, or 'Still waters run deep'.*



This means that the situation is insecure, uncertain and precarious, although officials from the littoral states (bordering the Black Sea) would disagree with this statement.

* The cartoons in this study were envisaged by the author and drawn by Lance Sucharov. I am very grateful to Lance Sucharov for the cartoons, 17 August 2008.

Key Points

Two positions, namely the undeclared agreement to maintain the status quo between Turkey and Russia and the 'dominance' of Turkey in the Straits at the ends of the Sea of Marmara pose a considerable difficulty for Turkey's North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies Bulgaria and Romania. So far their efforts to bring other members of the alliance and the United States into the Black Sea region have not been successful. Although it is correct to say that the Montreux Convention allows military vessels of non-littoral states access to the Black Sea, it also says explicitly that they *shall not remain in the Black Sea for longer than twenty-one days and should be of limited tonnage*¹ (author's italics). Whether the time has come to update or revise the convention remains a controversial issue for Turkey and, to a lesser degree, for Russia. Revision of the Montreux Convention, however, needs to be decided *by a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties. The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey* (author's italics).² There is, however, not even one paragraph in the convention that relates to its updating. An updating of the convention was not envisaged when the convention was signed. This difficulty should be openly discussed by the current NATO member states, who were original joint signatories of the convention (namely Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Romania and Turkey), Australia and Japan, successor states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) such as Georgia, Russia and Ukraine and successor states of the former Yugoslavia. These members of the convention should offer some solutions to the problem. So far the Russian government has stayed away and has not expressed its opinion about the difficult state of affairs. However, it is likely to be drawn into discussions if and when an update or a revision of the convention comes on the agenda.

Relations between Turkey and Russia are not as calm and friendly as the open sources and the academic journals present. There are several obstacles in the way and both sides warily watch each other's moves around the Black Sea area. Nabucco's pipeline dream (or perhaps its pipe dream) project is one of the key difficulties that hang over the relationship between the two countries, although officials in both countries would disagree with this statement. Further, they would say that the South Stream and Nabucco pipelines complement each other, which is certainly not the case.

Relations between Russia and the Ukraine and Russia and Georgia remain very tense and their present and future outlook remains very cloudy. Turkey's position is clear and unequivocal: it supports the principle of the territorial integrity of Georgia and peaceful resolutions of the conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia. The views of Turkey do not coincide with those of Russia - although Russian officials would also disagree with this statement. Turkey has, however, less clear view regarding the relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

The 'pipeline wars' between Turkey and Georgia, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other are likely to continue. It is hard to say at the moment with whom Bulgaria and Romania will side. There is less uncertainty in saying that Ukraine will side with Turkey and Georgia against Russia.

To sum up: the overall atmosphere in the region is certainly neither peaceful nor serene, although it appears to be so. Beneath the surface are various forces fighting each other and the difficulties remain on the margin of the open press coverage.

Introduction

This report deals with two crucial security policy agendas, namely hard or military security and energy security around the six countries that comprise the hard core of the Black Sea area. They are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Why look at these two areas and not other issues? - Because these two agendas are the ultimate tools of foreign and security policy. Energy security is a fairly new issue in addition to being a tool of foreign and security policy. In spite of being new, it has no less power to influence the stronger states to resist foreign pressure than has military security. This is shown in the cartoon below.

In a wonderful book, *Tales of Gulliver*, by Jonathan Swift, Gulliver for all his great strength, stamina and size was tightly tied to the ground by the little Lilliputian people. This is summed up in the cartoon below. The Lilliputians, or rather the modern day

Russia's Gazprom, a notorious energy enterprise, has tightly knotted the European Union (EU) Gulliver to its extensive gas infrastructure. In spite of the EU's mighty economic power and the EU's perception that its economic power can influence world politics, the mighty Gulliver has so far proved to be a clay colossus. It is never pleasant to recognise harsh realities but it is better to be aware of them and seek long-term solutions than to remain aloof and blind, or look for short-term quick solutions. In addition to knotting Gulliver to the ground, the Russian energy supply network has made of Gulliver a gas addict who has not yet found a cure for his addiction. It takes more than just a strong will to clean your body and soul from gas addiction, to rid yourself of the knots. It means shaking up relations that can be both, business-oriented and economically profitable for Russia and/or politically damaging and military imbalanced for the EU, but it can be done. For

instance, completion of the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) - also known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline - are good examples how things can be done without involving the Lilliputians. In addition, it shows that if the

resolve to tackle problem in a different manner is equally shared by the partner countries and there is financial support for the project, the project has a chance to be successful, although it may take a long time to accomplish it.



The addiction for gas from Russia has led two member states of the Black Sea region: Georgia and Turkey to join forces with Azerbaijan and seek alternative options. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is the end result of the joint endeavour. It began operating in June 2006. Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan successfully supported a natural gas pipeline to run between their three countries. This project, called the South Caucasus Pipeline or BTE, was completed in 2007.³ At the beginning of 2007 the BTE gas pipeline went into operation.⁴ The Nabucco gas pipeline project, which aims to make Turkey into an East-West energy corridor, may become an additional alternative. So far the project remains in limbo in spite of endless statements about its progress. There is no sense in discussing the potential energy links between three countries any further or, for instance, those between the three and Ukraine, because they are far from coming to fruition. To conclude, from the regional perspective, energy security is central to the thinking about the present as well as the future of the Black Sea region. For further discussion on the issue of energy security, see the section: *Energy security*.

In addition, the report deals with the military security agenda of the Narrow Black Sea region and not that of the Wider Black Sea region, which is very often the case. It is more useful to analyse the events within their microcosm and highlight both the divergent and convergent interests than to focus on general principles within the larger area. The Wider

Black Sea region has become the focal point in every discussion and in reports published on the region.⁵ Articles on the Black Sea area often mention a large number of various institutions, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) entity, the Community or Commonwealth of Democratic Choice (CDC), the BLACKSEAFOR, the Black Sea Harmony, and the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre (BBCIC)⁶. The variety of institutions or organisations is certainly impressive, but that is as far as it goes. As Iulian Chifu further noted, they are proving to be interesting forums of consultation, informal discussions on various issues, good exercises in promoting particular projects of co-operation, and frameworks for exercising working together and trusting the others. But these organisations could not assume the tasks of solving conflicts or ensuring security tasks.⁷ On the other hand, there is no sense in inventing new institutions or organisations. It is needed to outline clearly how the institutions or organisations that already exist can be transformed, enhanced and become militarily viable and capable of solving ongoing conflicts or future potential military threats around the Black Sea region, rather than continue pointing out their existence. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this report. An additional factor that should be remembered is that despite the proliferation over the past fifteen years of Black Sea regional organisations, Turkey still prefers to deal with countries bilaterally rather than

multilaterally. In this respect, Turkey is very much like Russia.⁸ This is the only way in which Turkey behaves very much like Russia, but this aspect cannot be overemphasised. It should not be forgotten that, as a member of NATO, Turkey knows more about multilateralism and its importance to its allies than does Russia. The latter, without a shadow of doubt, is not follower of multilateralism.

One of the very important questions is whether the Black Sea area may become a fault line for potential confrontation. If the answer is yes: under what circumstances? This is discussed in the sections: *Challenges ahead and Conclusion*.

It should be emphasised from the outset that the six littoral countries located around the region, namely Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine differ in military composition and energy security orientation. Bulgaria has a very modest military component and relies on Russia for the delivery of gas. Georgia has a fairly modest military that has been transformed over the last four years.

The military, however, is not yet ready for a large-scale confrontation. The BTC oil pipeline and BTE gas pipeline makes Georgia less vulnerable to a decrease or cut in oil and gas delivery from Russia, while the latter is not happy about such a state of affairs. Romania is slightly better organised in military terms than, for instance Bulgaria. At the same time, Romania relies on Russia for the delivery of gas, although there are some domestic gas reserves and much depends on their development. Ukraine has a well-established military infrastructure but relies on Russia for the delivery of gas and has not yet found a long-term alternative solution to this. Russia and Turkey are the heavyweights round the Black Sea and, as a result, set the tone of events around the region. Turkey, like all the other littoral states, relies on Russia for the delivery of gas but pays for it in hard currency and, as a result, is considered by Russia to be a lucrative and reliable customer.⁹ Thus, relations between Russia and Turkey are very different, more on a par, compared with the imbalanced relationships between Russia and the other littoral states.

Two Heavyweights: Russia and Turkey and the Montreux Conundrum

Whether the Black Sea area is the top priority for Turkey and Russia remains questionable. For Turkey and Russia the Black Sea is not the only area within the sight of their global ambitions and directions, although both states are littoral countries and clearly understand the importance of the energy resources and their transportation. What is evident, however, is that in any situation Russia stands resolutely against the attempts of the US, NATO, and Turkey to decrease its influence in the Black Sea region.

According to Igor Torbakov, Russia's approach to the Black Sea region appears to be guided by two principal considerations. First, the continued instability in the North Caucasus provinces of Russia had pushed the Kremlin to seek stability on its southern border. This situation could potentially encourage co-operation, but for now, it had mostly resulted in tensions, particularly with Western-leaning Georgia. Second, Russia seeks to secure its pre-eminent economic position in the region. This relates mostly to the control over energy resources and their transportation. Hence, any competing energy projects sponsored by the Western powers are looked on by Moscow with displeasure. To sum up, Russia's strategic thinking is still largely dominated by a zero-sum approach, in which the advancement of Euro-Atlantic interests in the Black Sea region are systematically considered as an unacceptable erosion of Russian interests.¹⁰ Whether this may lead to a crisis in relations between the two countries followed by confrontation remains to be seen. This point about the choppy relations between the two heavyweights will be covered below.

Turkey is in a somewhat different position but it, too, creates problems for the attainment of the Euro-Atlantic goals in the Black Sea region. Based

on its historic influence in the region and its status as a long-standing NATO member and prospective EU member, Turkey aspires to a leading role in the Black Sea. Bulgarians and Romanians often express concern about Turkey's efforts to 'dominate' the Black Sea. Referring to the Montreux Convention – a 1936 accord that puts the Turkish Straits under Ankara's control – Turkey appears to maintain the Black Sea as a Turkish-Russian lake.¹¹ As a result of Turkey's efforts to 'dominate' the Black Sea, it is often difficult to get the Black Sea NATO allies (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and partners along the littoral (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine) and in the 'wider' region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova) to focus beyond their narrow national interests. Hence, Black Sea 'regional security co-operation' remains elusive.¹² From an EU perspective, there is no rationale in questioning the Montreux Convention, and Turkish co-operation with EU strategies in the region will be much more forthcoming if there are no questions on this point. This will, in turn, enable policies in the region to be an avenue for Turkish co-operation with the EU, greatly increasing the chances of success.¹³

At the same time, what brings Ankara's and Moscow's positions closer together is that the two countries may perceive the Euro-Atlantic (and particularly US) policies in the Black Sea and Caucasus region as being potentially destabilising for their vital interests. Both Ankara and Moscow are extremely keen to preserve the status quo in the region while they perceive the West in general and Washington in particular as dangerous agents of change.¹⁴ Svante Cornell *et al.*, however, introduced an additional important element to the notion of maintaining the status quo. Turkey has strongly argued for retaining the Montreux Convention in

order to preserve its role as the region's major NATO member and to preserve its independence; and Russia has done so in order to prevent the militarization of the Black Sea, as it fully aware of its inability to match a potential US presence there. The role of strategic energy resources and their transportation also plays an integral part in this striving towards the *status quo*.¹⁵ The recent Russian-Georgian war has demonstrated, however, that the Russian Bear is no longer despondent and the time of eternal sleep is over. Thus, the case of Russia's inability to match... might no longer be valid. Interestingly enough, Zeyno Baran also noted that it is instructive that while Turkey refers to this waterway as "the Turkish Straits," the West in general refers to them as "the Bosphorus" and "the Dardanelles," which are both Greek names. Thus, there is also residual concern that any change to Montreux could lead to tension with Greece.¹⁶ The end result regarding Montreux is not as simple as it perhaps looks like. Nonetheless, it appears that Russia and Turkey have reached an unsigned agreement to maintain the status quo round the Black Sea, but for different reasons, which are not exactly convergent.

Other littoral states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia do not seem to have a desire to renegotiate the Montreux Convention, as they have neither the ambition nor the potential to develop naval capabilities to match those of Turkey or Russia.¹⁷ In addition, other littoral states are in favour of maintaining the status quo, for two more reasons. First, this demilitarises the Black Sea in favour of a BSEC focus on soft security issues, which is what will ultimately bring the region on to the EU's agenda. Second, the main interests of the smaller littoral states are unrelated to maritime security in the Black Sea. Issues such as resolving 'frozen' conflicts, membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, and strengthening their sovereignty and independence, have little impact on the Montreux convention. In other words, the interests of smaller littoral states are related to greater western engagement in a wide range of issues affecting the Wider Black Sea region – but not necessarily to issues pertaining to the Black Sea *per se* and its maritime military balance.¹⁸ Although the other states, namely Bulgaria and Romania 'do not seem to have a desire to renegotiate...', they are certainly not in favour of Turkey's dominance. For more information, see note 13. Thus, there is certain divergence of views between the three NATO allies. How this divergence, namely 'no desire to renegotiate' but at the same time not in favour of Turkey's dominance can be reconciled remains to be seen. There is also a certain divergence of interests within the EU (see note 15) since Bulgaria and Romania are members of the Union and both countries have a problem with accepting the dominance of Turkey. So far Russia has abstained from expressing its view of the divergence of interests between the NATO allies. It considers this matter to be their internal issue as long as an update

or revision of the convention is not on the agenda. Interestingly enough, the FSU, as long ago as August 1946, demanded revision of the Montreux convention but Turkey rejected the Soviet demands.¹⁹

It is evident, however, that Russia wishes to retain its position in the region as one of the main actors, given the emergence of new strong regional (Turkey) and external actors (the US and NATO) prone to exploit, with the collapse of the USSR, a historic opportunity to increase their influence in the region.²⁰ In other words, Russia does not approve of the emergence of Turkey. Furthermore, it perceives the emergence of Turkey as a plausible threat or rather, perhaps, as a potential rival to its interests in the region – although Russian officials would disagree with or perhaps even dismiss this statement out of hand. Though it is not exactly the status quo as described by Igor Torbakov (see note 16), Ankara fiercely resisted any involvement by external actors in the operation of the BLACKSEAFOR.²¹ Not all Black Sea littorals share Turkey's opposition to a NATO presence. Both Romania and Bulgaria have demonstrated their willingness potentially to provide a permanent base for NATO or US forces in the Black Sea area.²² Despite the latter's willingness, so far Turkey has prevailed and kept NATO or US forces at bay.

Turkish (and Russian) efforts to minimise the US presence and prevent NATO's Operation Active Endeavour from operating in the Black Sea by invoking the Montreux Convention and by promoting Black Sea Harmony/BLACKSEAFOR as alternatives, seem consistent with their apparent objective to maintain maritime dominance. Turkey's motives are being influenced by tensions between their NATO membership obligations, on the one hand, and their shifting mood regarding the EU, concerns about US activities in Iraq (particularly their potential to exacerbate Kurdish separatism) and their desire to maintain national influence throughout the region on the other. These interests need to be balanced with rising concerns in Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania, who would like NATO (and the United States) to be present to act as a "balancer." For these reasons, 'It is the opinion of this author that current forms of co-operation lack substance and will continue to do so until all the Black Sea littoral states see their national interests being met.'²³ Whether all these interests will be met remains an open question.

What is evident, however, is that co-operation between the six littoral states remains very limited and not often successful. Vesselin Petkov stated clearly that the Black Sea countries often give regional co-operation a lower priority as compared with that of Euro-Atlantic institutions.²⁴ As long as this remains the case, there is always a chance for a mishap or error that may lead to potential crisis situation. Although it is hard to envisage conflict between Russia and Turkey at the moment, such a

scenario should not be dismissed out of hand. More often such scenarios are envisaged with regard to Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Georgia. Iulian Chifu noted that Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan support a more active role for the Ukraine in the Black Sea in order to counter-balance the dominant role of the former superpower, Russia.²⁵ Chifu has not, however, elaborated further on the subject. It therefore remains unknown what kind of 'more active role' Ukraine should play in the Black Sea. In addition, Ukraine may hesitate to antagonise Russia, although there is enough bad rhetoric between the two countries.

It appears, however, that there is no danger of conflict neither between Russia and Romania, Russia and Bulgaria, nor between Turkey and Bulgaria and Turkey and Romania. Although there is currently no danger of conflict between the NATO allies there is, however, a divergence of interests related to the Turkish dominance over the Straits. This divergence needs to be addressed and resolved rather sooner than later within the framework of the NATO Alliance with participation of all the former signatories to the Montreux Convention. This is a daunting task because signatories to the Montreux Convention belong to different groups with very different interests and, for Turkey and Russia in particular, much is still at stake. Policy recommendations pertained to divergence of interests between the NATO allies are beyond the present report.

As for the EU policy towards the Black Sea region, Iulian Chifu noted that in March 2006 the think tanks close to Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), evaluated the policy of the EU for the first time. The result was, that 'The EU policy is not yet there, but the mechanism for reaching a decision and to validate such a document is in place, and we expect to have such a policy no later than the beginning of 2007.'²⁶ Igor Torbakov in his assessment related to the policy of the EU was concise, precise and straightforward. 'As for the United Europe, it was often noted that the bloc is pursuing not just one but three strategies towards the

Black Sea region: enlargement to Romania, Bulgaria and, possibly, Turkey; European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) toward Moldova, Ukraine and the South Caucasus countries; and, in addition, the EU has a special relationship with Russia. However, as one recent commentator asserts, 'To speak about a comprehensive EU strategy towards the Black Sea is more appropriate in future than in the...present tense.' So far, such a comprehensive strategy does not exist.²⁷ Whether such a strategy will emerge in the future remains to be seen, however, signs pointing to the emergence of such a strategy are not optimistic. Although Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007 their voices in the EU concerning the Black Sea region are not very loud and neither country's military leadership is very visible when it comes to addressing the issue of the military security round the Black Sea region. Or perhaps, as Iulian Chifu wrote to the author: 'Since this is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) but rather that of the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) business – or at least the MoFA State Secretary for security matters' prerogative – this is less visible.'²⁸ Whether the policies of the two countries towards the Black Sea area is really effective remains unknown.

To the extent that regional states are interested in developing more effective multilateral approaches, especially in the realm of security, co-operation on maritime issues, including search and rescue (SAR), surveillance and interdiction, these will be a relatively uncontroversial place to start (this has also been the case along the southern shores of Mediterranean). Initiatives such as the Turkish-led Black Sea Harmony are one example of this functional approach.²⁹ The proposal for an overarching maritime policy is, however, extremely vague at this stage. The concept is being promoted as a new EU policy domain for all of the seas that adjoin the EU, but it is far from firmly established operationally at EU level, and so its regional applications also seem remote at the present time.³⁰ That is the basic weaknesses of the EU policy in the Black Sea area; it remains vague. As long as it remains poorly-articulated and not really implemented, tensions between the littoral states will continue to dominate the agenda.

Challenges Ahead

It may not be politically correct to say so, but the additional problem that will always be around is that of Russia. As Ian Lesser presents in his analysis, in an even more negative case, friction with Russia could spur a remilitarisation of the Black Sea region, in the sense of higher defence spending, a greater emphasis on capabilities beyond territorial defence, and a revival of Russian naval activity in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Rapid integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova into Western institutions, including security structures – one strategic response to a more assertive Russian policy – may need to be accompanied by a more active, positive engagement with Moscow to forestall

a spiral of regional competition, and to lessen the prospect of a new cold war with Russia.³¹ The author is not convinced that positive engagement with Russia by the West is the right recipe for success. On the other hand, the West often shies away from a having a confrontation tone with Russia and, as a result, Russia increases its rhetorical stance and becomes emboldened to act.

The wider Black Sea region could also experience a cascading effect on security perceptions and military balances. The spread of longer-range ballistic missiles (LRBM) and growing nuclear potential across the region will have an effect on defence

posture. Russian responses could have a similar effect on perceptions in Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The net effect could be to draw the Black Sea region closer to the heavily militarised and highly unstable environment in the Middle East, posing new challenges for Western partners who may not welcome an increase in their own security exposure. This, in turn, could have longer-term implications for further NATO and EU enlargement around the Black Sea.³² Such as? Ian Lesser has not, however, elaborated his statement further.

Moscow may well feel capable of challenging American interests much more directly in its own neighbourhood, and especially around the Black Sea area. This need not take the form of an aggressive strategic competition. It might simply mean the return of Russia as a rival security arbiter around the region, and as a leader in purely regional economic and security initiatives. Some states, not least Turkey, may find this an attractive alternative geometry to a European or NATO-centric approach, or simply useful diversification. Others such as Bulgaria and Romania would probably retain a stronger western orientation. The orientation of Ukraine and Georgia will remain delicately poised between these alternative orientations. Indeed, this bears some resemblance to current conditions.³³ The author considers the attitude of Turkey toward resurgent Russia to be neither appealing nor favourable. Both countries share a fairly narrow common agenda in the economic sphere and tourism, rather than an extensive political, military and energy agenda. The first agenda is often discussed by the open sources, while the latter is by and large absent from discussion.³⁴ Maintaining the status quo round the Black Sea area is not a common agenda but rather a common position and the reasons for maintaining the status quo as discussed above are not convergent.³⁵

Beyond the unresolved conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and Abkhazia extensively discussed by Svante Cornell *et al.*³⁶, there has also been a significant deterioration in relations

between Russia and Georgia³⁷. Trenin also noted another important sticking point in relations between Russia and Georgia. From Moscow's perspective, Georgia joining NATO would also be a bad example to neighbouring Azerbaijan.³⁸

There are also potential conflicts in relations between Russia and Ukraine related to the issue of the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and gas exploration in the same sea.³⁹ On 20 May 2008 Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, issued a decree to prepare a draft of a law that could remove Russia's Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol from 2017. In a statement issued on 21 May, the Russian MoFA said that it presumed that the Black Sea Fleet 'will continue to be on the territory of Ukraine in the future' and that to discuss the fleet's basing arrangements 'is premature at this stage'. The MoFA added that Yushchenko's decree came 'as a surprise', because an action plan drawn up previously by the two nations had agreed 'an entirely different thing'. Moscow also said that adoption of the decree 'with incomprehensible haste for us, certainly will not contribute to strengthening the atmosphere of trust between Russia and Ukraine and may adversely affect the negotiation process on the Black Sea Fleet'.⁴⁰ On 24 June 2008 Vasily Kirilitch, the head press officer within the Ukrainian MoFA, said that Russian naval units stationed on the Crimean peninsula must leave and not return by 29 May 2017: the day the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the Black Sea Fleet division, signed in 1997, expires. Kiev said there would be no further negotiations on this issue because it would run counter to the country's constitution. Kirilitch also stressed that 'This is the case that would never be discussed'.⁴¹ As we can see, the reaction from Russia was negative and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Russia would do its utmost to dictate the rules of the game to Ukraine and this scenario does not bode well for Ukraine. This negative scenario would be dismissed out of hand by the Russian officials. For scenario prepared by the Rand Corporation, namely War between Russia and Ukraine, see note⁴².

Energy Security

The 'pipeline war', being in some sense a consequence of political tensions and conflicts in the region, will, no doubt, in its turn, aggravate political and military contradictions, driving farther apart Russia, Armenia and Iran on the one side and the US, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia on the other.⁴³ In addition to the point made above, Baran also stated that there several pipeline projects are underway, but there is not enough oil to fill all these pipelines. As a result, competition over pipelines could eventually prove problematic to one of Turkey's primary Black Sea objectives: maintaining good relations with the other five littoral states.⁴⁴ Does this mean that the position for Turkey of 'maintaining good relations...' is no longer tenable? Is it likely to change? What will be the consequences

of this change for Turkey in particular and for the Black Sea region in general? Can we envisage cut-throat competition for the pipelines between for instance, Turkey and Russia? Baran has not, however, elaborated her statement any further.

The future political and even strategic impact of BTC and other proposed oil and gas routes is uncertain. On the one hand, increased revenue can fund vital infrastructure projects and contribute to local development in some of the most endemically poor parts of the Black Sea zone. On the other hand, increased revenue coming to the Georgian and Azerbaijani states may well be earmarked for military modernisation and create the conditions for an eventual attempt to retake lost territories.⁴⁵ Thus,

this ambiguity between local investment and military modernisation should be kept in balance. Whether the Georgian government would be able to maintain this balance is not known. What is evident, however, is that the construction and operation of the BTC and the BTE pipelines irritates Russia and severely undermines its oil and gas monopoly round the Black Sea area in the post-Soviet era.

As mentioned above, Russia's gas policy with regard to Georgia and Ukraine has been fairly consistent, namely to bully both countries into accepting increased prices for the delivery of gas from Russia or be punished for refusing to accept the conditions.⁴⁶ Russia's policy vis-à-vis the Nabucco pipeline project is well documented.⁴⁷ However, the best and certainly a very ironic, point of view relating to the Nabucco project was cited in Vladimir Socor's article. Since Hungary's decision to join the South Stream gas pipeline, the Nabucco project appears to be almost dead. At the signing ceremony on 28 February 2008 President Vladimir Putin mocked the Nabucco project and stated: 'You can build a pipeline or even two, three, or five. The question is what fuel you put through it and where do you get that fuel. If someone wants to dig into the ground and bury metal there in the form of a pipeline, please

do so, we don't object...There can be no competition when one project has the gas and the other does not.'⁴⁸ The recent issue of *Strana*-daily online cited Evgeny Satanovsky, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Near East, who noted that, 'Moscow stated unequivocally that Ankara should not pretend to be the key actor in the transit of energy resources from the territory of the FSU via the Black Sea and Mediterranean to the world markets.'⁴⁹ This was a clear rebuke to Turkey and a clear signal from Moscow that it will hinder the efforts of Turkey to pursue the Nabucco project, which so far has turned out to be not a pipeline project but rather a pipe dream project. In order to sweeten the bitter pile for Nabucco's lack of success, during Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev's visit to Ankara in the second half of July 2008, two countries agreed to set up a joint company to run Turkey's urban gas grids.⁵⁰

To conclude, Russian energy policies have been crafted to serve Russia's interests in dominating the Eurasian gas markets and exerting significant market power with regard to volumes, export routes and prices. All these competing gas plans make the Black Sea region a central stage of geopolitical and geo-economics struggle and clashes of interests.⁵¹

Conclusion

The Black Sea region is not just an area where diverse economic interests conflict; it is also a region of complex geopolitical fault lines and frontiers. Whether the actors involved will pursue zero-sum strategies, or whether non-confrontational competition will prevail, is hard to judge at the moment. Whether this conundrum is an opportunity or a cure for the Black Sea region remains to be seen.⁵²

As mentioned above, each country in the region has its strengths and weaknesses as well as convergent and divergent interests. As for the interests of Turkey, it can be said that the last thing that Turkey needs is new dividing lines in its neighbourhood⁵³, namely the Black Sea region. Thus far the policy of maintaining the status quo has been a central piece of Turkish foreign and security policy. How long Turkey can keep this up it remains unknown. What is evident, however, is that Turkey faces a problem of maintaining the status quo in the Black Sea region. Whether Turkey will be induced to change its position regarding the Montreux Convention remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the issue of Montreux is not going to disappear from the agenda as quickly as perhaps Turkey might wish it to.⁵⁴ NATO's forum might be the right place to discuss thoroughly the issue of the convention.

The not so calm and tranquil interests of and relations between Turkey and Russia will remain as such for the foreseeable future – although officials from both countries would disagree with the author's forecast. They will continue to emphasise their convergent economic agendas and rapport in

relations between the presidents and prime ministers of two countries. The divergent interests of Russia and Turkey in the energy sector will continue to dominate both countries' agenda and, as a result, will affect other littoral states. The Russian attempt to sweeten the Turkish bitter pile regarding the Nabucco pipeline is not likely to succeed in the long run since Turkey is no longer willing to play a passive role in the energy business.

Romania is likely to invest in its domestic energy sector and could ask for financial assistance from the EU. On the other hand, Bulgaria has a very limited option in the energy sector and, as a result, is likely to continue its reliance on the delivery of gas from Russia. Ukrainian gas dependence on Russia has been, and still is, a crucial handicap for Ukraine. As long as Ukraine remains heavily dependent on Russia, the latter would manipulate the former, notwithstanding various agreements signed by both countries.

Russian interests in the Black Sea region have been, and still are, on a collision course with those of Ukraine and Georgia. The views of Turkey on Georgia do not coincide with those of Russia.⁵⁵ The recent war between Russia and Georgia exposed the military weakness of the latter⁵⁶ and sent a clear message to Ukraine 'Beware of the tilt to the West and don't think that the West will come to your rescue'. The views of Turkey on Ukraine remains very ambiguous and it appears, that for the time being, Ukraine is the weakest link in the Black Sea military and energy security chain.

Notes:

- ¹ *Traduction – Translation Convention Regarding the Regime of the (Turkish) Straits Signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936* online www.turkishpilots.org.tr/ingilizcedernek/DOCUMENTS/montro.html. See Article 18, Paragraphs (1c) and (2) in particular. The aggregate tonnage that the non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows: (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 30.000 tonnes; (b) If in at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10.000 tonnes the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30.000 tonnes mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45.000 tonnes. Article 18, Paragraphs (1a and 1b).
- ² *Ibid*; See Article 29.
- ³ Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st century: Strategic, economic and energy perspectives*. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008; p. 100. Hereafter cited as Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea region” in *The Wider Black Sea region*.
- ⁴ Nika Chitadze, “Security trends in the Black Sea region and role of Georgia in the energy security of the region” in *The Proceedings of the International Conference on ‘The Black Sea Security in the Aftermath of 9/11: Changing Parameters and New Approaches’* in Middle East Technical University (METU)-Ankara, 9 October 2006 online [www.kora.metu.edu.tr/proceedings/Black Sea Security in the Aftermath of 911 Changing Parameters and New Approaches.pdf](http://www.kora.metu.edu.tr/proceedings/Black%20Sea%20Security%20in%20the%20Aftermath%20of%209%2F11%20Changing%20Parameters%20and%20New%20Approaches.pdf); p. 111. Hereafter cited as Nika Chitadze, “Security Trends” in *The Proceedings*.
- ⁵ To mention just a few, see for instance, *The Proceedings*. See also Harvard University, Black Sea Security Program (BSSP) online <http://harvard-bssp.org>. Svante Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson, Per Häggström, “The Wider Black Sea Region: An emerging hub in European security”, in *Silk Road Paper* (December 2006), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program online www.isdp.eu/files/publications/srp/06/sc06widerblack.pdf. Hereafter cited as Svante Cornell *et al.*, “The Wider Black Sea”. Ian Lesser, “Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider strategic influences on the Black Sea”, in *Xenophon Paper*, no. 4 (November 2007), International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) online [www.icbss.org/index.php?option/=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=45](http://www.icbss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=45). Hereafter cited as Ian Lesser, “Global trends”; Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott (Editors), *The Wider Black Sea region in the 21st century: Strategic, economic and energy perspectives*. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008 and Mamuka Tsereteli, “Economic and Energy Security: Connecting Europe and the Black Sea-Caspian Region”, in *Silk Road Paper* (March 2008), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program online www.isdp.eu/http%3A/%252Fwww.isdp.eu/files/publications/srp/mt0803economicenergy.
- ⁶ For the BSEC, the CDC and GUAM, see Svante Cornell *et al.*, “The Wider Black Sea”; p. 8. See also Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 113.

For the BSEC, see Nika Chitadze, “Security Trends” in *The Proceedings*; p. 105; Svante Cornell *et al.*, “The Wider Black Sea”; p. 12; pp. 15-16; pp. 106-108; pp. 114-115; Suat Kiniklioglu, “Turkey’s Black Sea Policy: Strategic interplay at a critical junction” in *Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea*, Ronald D. Asmus (Editor) online www.gmfus.org/doc/BSBook.pdf; pp. 61-62. Hereafter see as Suat Kiniklioglu, “Turkey’s Black Sea Policy”. Jeffrey Simon, “Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building bridges and barriers” in *Next Steps in Forging*; pp. 86-87. Hereafter see as Jeffrey Simon, “Black Sea Regional Security”. Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “Regional Co-operation in the Black Sea Area in the Context of EU-Russia Relations” in *Xenophon Paper*, no. 5 (April 2008), ICBSS online [www.icbss.org/index.php?option/=com_content&task=view&id=31Item&id=45](http://www.icbss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31Item&id=45); pp. 36-37. Hereafter cited as Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “Regional Co-operation”. Charles King, “The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 2; pp. 14-16; Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 87-88; Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*, p. 113; Michael Emerson, “The EU’s New Black Sea policy” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 257; p. 262; pp. 265-268; Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “Troubled Strategic Partnership: The Black Sea Dimension of Russia’s Relations with the West” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 293. Hereafter cited as Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “Troubled Strategic Partnership” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*.

For GUAM, the CDC, the BSEC, and the BLACKSEAFOR see Sergiy Glebov, “The Black Sea Security as a Regional Concern for the Black Sea States and Global Powers” in *The Proceedings*; pp. 11-12; p. 15 and p. 18. Hereafter see as Sergiy Glebov, “The Black Sea Security” in *The Proceedings*.

For the BLACKSEAFOR, see Grigory Tischenko, "Security Problems in the Black Sea Region" in *The Proceedings*; pp. 50-51; Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 69; Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; p. 87. See also Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 88-90; Suat Kiniklioglu, "Turkey's Black Sea policy"; p. 61.

For the Black Sea Harmony, see Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 70; Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; pp. 87-88; Ian Lesser, "Global trends"; note 10, p. 16. See also Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 89; Suat Kiniklioglu, "Turkey's Black Sea policy"; p. 61.

For GUAM, see Sergiy Glebov, "The Black Sea Security" in *The Proceedings*; pp. 9-10; Nika Chitadze, "Security Trends" in *The Proceedings*; p. 105; Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; pp. 108-109. See also "Round Table at Military-Political Problems Research Foundation" in *Military Diplomat*, no. 4 (2007), pp. 42-43; pp. 45-48; pp. 51-53; Jonathan Kulick and Temuri Yakobashvili, "Georgia and the Wider Black Sea" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 32; Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 92; Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*, p. 113; Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, "Troubled Strategic Partnership" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 300-301.

For CDC, see Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; pp. 109-111. Jonathan Kulick and Temuri Yakobashvili, "Georgia and the Wider Black Sea" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 32; Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*, p. 113 and Suat Kiniklioglu, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy"; pp. 62-63.

For the BBCIC, see Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; p. 93. Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 89.

For all of the organisations mentioned above, see Vesselin Petkov, "What Security is Needed for the Black Sea Region: A Bulgarian perspective" in *The Proceedings*; pp. 102-103. Hereafter cited as Vesselin Petkov, "What Security is Needed" in *The Proceedings*.

⁷ "Wider Black Sea Region Looking for a Strategic Security Concept" in *The Proceedings*; p. 92. Hereafter cited as Iulian Chifu, "Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Proceedings*.

⁸ Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 94.

⁹ For a table on total imports of gas from Russia by Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine, see Velichka Milina, "Energy Security and Geopolitics" in *The Quarterly Journal*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 2007) online https://consortium.pims.org/filestore2/download/3940/Energy_Security_and_Geopolitics.pdf; p. 31. For a detail presentation of Bulgaria's gas supply from Russia, see *Ibid*; pp. 37-38. Two countries, Georgia and Romania are absent from the table. See also Gerhard Mangott and Kirsten Westphal, "The Relevance of the Wider Black Sea Region to EU and Russian Energy Issues" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 174. Mangott and Westphal in the same article noted that Romania imports around 40 per cent of gas from Russia. pp. 174-175.

¹⁰ "Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Strategy in the Black Sea Region" in *The Proceedings*; p. 75. Hereafter cited as Igor Torbakov, "Challenges" in *The Proceedings*. The same Russian zero-sum approach was also described by Daniel Hamilton, "A Transatlantic Strategy for the Black Sea?" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 326.

¹¹ Igor Torbakov, "Challenges" in *The Proceedings*; pp. 75-76. The point about 'dominating' was emphasised by Daniel Hamilton, *Ibid*; p. 333 and Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; p. 84. Interestingly enough, as Jeffrey Simon noted in note 7 of his article, on separate occasions Bulgarian and Romanian officials have gone so far as to suggest privately that US ships could operate on the Black Sea under their flag to circumvent Montreux restrictions. p. 88. The author considers this suggestion very unhelpful to relations between the NATO allies. On the other hand, the joining of NATO by Bulgaria and Romania might nevertheless present a possibility for the US to gain access to the Black Sea naval theatre through military support to their navies. Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 64.

¹² Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; p. 84.

¹³ Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; pp. 10-11. A very similar point was expressed by Daniel Hamilton, who stated that any Western package involving Turkey should include additional reassurances about the sanctity of the Montreux convention... "A Transatlantic Strategy for the Black Sea?" in *The Wider Black Sea region*; p. 333.

- ¹⁴ Igor Torbakov, "Challenges" in *The Proceedings*; p. 76. According to Ian Lesser, the Black Sea area will be a defining sphere of action for Europe, and for Russia, part of the 'near abroad' for Moscow and Brussels ("Global Trends"; p. 35) in the years ahead, if and when, Turkey joins the Union. Otherwise, the Black Sea area will remain largely a defining sphere of action between Russia and Turkey with other littoral states siding either with Turkey or Russia (author's comment). According to Svante Cornell *et al.* 'The mood in Ankara can be summarised as fearing a negative fallout of American adventures in the Black Sea just as happened in the Middle East'. "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 64. See also *Ibid*; pp. 71-72. For the Russian and Turkish opposition to the introduction of the non-littoral powers to the region, see Suat Kiniklioglu, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy"; p. 59. For an elaborated explanation on the issue and repercussions of the Montreux Convention, see *Ibid*; pp. 55-58. For the first ever suggestion 'That conditions have sufficiently changed since 9/11 [2001] to merit a review of the 1936 Montreux Treaty limitations for the Black Sea,' see Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; p. 86; p. 90.
- ¹⁵ "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 62; pp. 71-72. See also Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 90. For a clearly expressed case of Russia's inability to match a potential US presence in the Black Sea see http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2008-09-05/1_blacksea.html?mthree=4.
- ¹⁶ Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 90.
- ¹⁷ Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 64. According to Rear Admiral Dorin Danila, the Chief of Romanian Naval Forces Staff, 'From a statistical point of view our naval forces are about 10 per cent of the entire armed forces'. Tim Fish, "Romania Embraces NATO Integration Challenges" in *Jane's Navy International* (July/August 2008), p. 27. It means that the naval force is fairly small and certainly not a match to those of Turkey and Russia. For the complete article, see *Ibid*; pp. 26-31.
- ¹⁸ Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 72. A similar idea was expressed in the same article on p. 65.
- ¹⁹ For further information, see www.globalsecurity.org/militarily/world/naval-arms-control-1936.htm
- ²⁰ Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, "Regional Co-operation"; p. 25. A very similar point was made by Svante Cornell *et al.* They noted that Russia supports the Turkish stance to prevent the militarisation of the Black Sea, as it does not want to see a further shift of the military balance in its neighbourhood in the West's favour, and are *already concerned of growing Turkish maritime supremacy in the Black Sea* (author's italics). "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 64. See also *Ibid*; p. 70.
- ²¹ For further information on the BLACKSEAFOR, see note 8. For the Turkish and Russian opposition to the extension of NATO's operation Active Endeavour from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, see Ian Lesser, "Global Trends"; p. 16. See also Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 90.
- ²² *Ibid*; p. 90; p. 98. See also the very interesting point raised by Jeffrey Simon, note 13.
- ²³ Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea regional security"; pp. 88-89. See also note 14.
- ²⁴ "What Security is Needed" in *The Proceedings*; p. 104. See also Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 117. For several ideas related to any Black Sea regional co-operation, see Jeffrey Simon, "Black Sea Regional Security"; pp. 85-86; p. 89.
- ²⁵ "Wider Black Sea Region" in *The Proceedings*; p. 84.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*; p. 81. In an e-mail from Iulian Chifu to Eugene Kogan, Chifu noted that 'At the level of the EU, it is just a synergy that was adopted. And the outcome was very weak without really addressing the security matters. Few general things were addressed with too much emphasis on BSEC, which is an organisation without any real agenda, budget or achievements.' 10 June 2008. For the BSEC, see note 8.
- ²⁷ Igor Torbakov, "Challenges" in *The Proceedings*; pp. 72-73. See also Svante Cornell *et al.*, "The Wider Black Sea"; p. 113. The EU's triple strategy was also emphasised in an article by Michael Emerson "The EU's New Black Sea Policy" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 258. In addition, Emerson noted that pursuing an effective Black Sea regionalism is going to be an uphill struggle. p. 258; p. 264.
- ²⁸ E-mail from Iulian Chifu to Eugene Kogan, 25 June 2008.
- ²⁹ Ian Lesser, "Global Trends"; p. 16. For more information on the Black Sea Harmony, see note 8.
- ³⁰ Michael Emerson, "The EU's New Black Sea Policy" in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 265.

- ³¹ “Global Trends”; pp. 20-21. For a more competitive relationship with Russia, see *Ibid*; p. 20.
- ³² *Ibid*; p. 24.
- ³³ *Ibid*; p. 36.
- ³⁴ For two exceptionally well written papers on the divergence of interests of Russia and Turkey, see Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?” in *Survival*, no. 48, vol. 1 (March 2006), pp. 81-92 and Igor Torbakov’s, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations”, in *Occasional Paper* (October 2007) online www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-Torbakov/Turkey/Russia.pdf; pp. 1-19. See also a clear statement on divergence of interests expressed by Mensur Akgun, director of the Istanbul-based Foreign Policy Programme at the Turkish Economic and Social Sciences Foundation (TESEV, known under its Turkish acronym *Turkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etudier Vakfi*). He noted that ‘Stability in Georgia and keeping Russians away from its borders as much as possible is in Turkey’s interests’. www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=112229 – online on 11 August 2008. See also www.gazeta.ru/comments/2008/08/18_a_2814298.shtml. In a recent article written by Bulent Aliriza it was stated that ‘While there is no particular affection [in Turkey] for Russia or its leaders, there is also little sympathy for Georgia or its impetuous president’. For a complete article, see “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus” online http://csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task/view/id,4868/type,1/ - online on 9 September 2008. Finally, the annual *Transatlantic Trends* 2008 survey noted that ...1 per cent of Turkish respondents felt that Turkey should act with Russia on international matters. See www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2008_English_Key.pdf; p. 21.
- ³⁵ For a different picture relating to the Turkish-Russian relations, namely that they are more favourable and deepening, see Suat Kiniklioglu, “Turkey’s Black Sea Policy”; pp. 58-60. For the converging economic interests, see for instance, A. A. Gur’yev, “Situatsiya v Turtsii: iyul’ 2008 goda” (“Situation in Turkey: as of July 2008”) online <http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2008/01-08-08c.htm>. See also *Idem*, “K nekotorym itogam vizita Sergeya Lavrova v Turtsiyu” (“About some Conclusion of Sergey Lavrov’s Visit to Turkey”) online www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2008/08-07-08c.htm.
- ³⁶ “The Wider Black Sea”; p. 40; pp. 44-51. See also Jonathan Kulick and Temuri Yakobashvili, “Georgia and the Wider Black Sea” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 29-30; Anna Matveeva, “Conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Area” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 178-179; p. 181; pp. 191-193; pp. 206-208; pp. 211-212; p. 223; F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and Black Sea Security” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 281-283; Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “Troubled Strategic Partnership” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 305-306; C. W. Blandy, “Georgia and Russia: A further deterioration in relations” in Advanced Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), *Caucasus Series* 08/22 (July 2008), pp. 1-2; pp. 5-6 online www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus. Hereafter cited as C. W. Blandy, “Georgia and Russia”.
- ³⁷ Elhan Mehtiyev, “Caucasian Security Policy: Analyses of current realities in the context of Black Sea security” in *The Proceedings*; pp. 134-135. “The Wider Black Sea”; pp. 57-59. See also Jonathan Kulick and Temuri Yakobashvili, “Georgia and the Wider Black Sea” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 27-28; p. 49; Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*, pp. 109-111; Anna Matveeva, “Conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Area” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 191-195; pp. 216-218; C. W. Blandy, “Georgia and Russia”; p. 2; pp. 7-9.
- ³⁸ Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 110. The issue of Azerbaijan is, however, goes beyond the topic of this report. See also Anna Matveeva, “Conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Area” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 214-216.
- ³⁹ For the issue of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, see F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and Black Sea Security” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 284.
- ⁴⁰ *Jane’s Navy International* (July/August 2008), p. 6. For reinforcement of President Yushchenko decree, see www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=905853 – online on 24 June 2008. Volodymyr Ogrzyzko, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that draft law was ready and would soon be put before parliament. www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3639475&c=EUR&c=SEA – online on 22 July 2008.
- ⁴¹ *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 9 July 2008, p. 13; 27 August 2008, p. 10. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated in clear terms that ‘We need to maintain this agreement until 2017 and then we need to make Ukraine a zone

- free of any military bases'. www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3739960&c=EUR&s=TOP – online on 24 September 2008.
- ⁴² David Shlapak, “*Selected scenarios*”, in Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian Lesser (Editors), *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and US Strategy*. Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 1998 online www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.app.pdf; pp. 326-329.
- ⁴³ Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “*Regional Co-operation*”; p. 27. See also Jonathan Kulick and Temuri Yakobashvili, “*Georgia and the Wider Black Sea*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 26.
- ⁴⁴ For the complexity of pipeline projects in the region, see “*Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 91-92. For Turkey’s difficult policy choices, see *Defense News*, 1 September 2008, p. 26.
- ⁴⁵ Charles King, “*The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 17.
- ⁴⁶ For further information, see “*The Wider Black Sea*”; pp. 78-79; p. 81. See also Gerhard Mangott and Kirsten Westphal, “*The Relevance of the Wider Black Sea Region to EU and Russian Energy Issues*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 150-151; p. 174.
- ⁴⁷ See for instance, *The Wider Black Sea*; pp. 92-94. See also Michael Thumann, “*European Energy Security, the Black Sea and Russian Interests – Can there be a common strategy?*” in *Next Steps in Forging*; p. 133; John Roberts, “*Dossier Energy: The cut-throat energy politics of Russia and Turkey*” <http://europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=e6334cf2> – online on 28 February 2007; Nicklas Norling, “*Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic decisions for Europe*” in *Silk Road Paper* (November 2007), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program online www.isdp.eu/files/publications/srp/07/0711Nabucco.pdf. Gerhard Mangott and Kirsten Westphal, “*The Relevance of the Wider Black Sea Region to EU and Russian Energy Issues*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; pp. 161-163; pp. 175-176; Daniel Hamilton, “*A Transatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea?*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 325.
- ⁴⁸ “*South Stream Gas Project Defeating Nabucco by Default*,” in *Eurasian Daily Monitor* (EDM), 5 March 2008 online www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372856.
- ⁴⁹ www.strana.ru/doc.html?id=102832cid=1 – online on 2 July 2008. See also www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?newsid=115949 – online on 22 September 2008.
- ⁵⁰ For several other joint projects, see www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?newsid=1105545 – online on 23 July 2008.
- ⁵¹ Gerhard Mangott and Kirsten Westphal, “*The Relevance of the Wider Black Sea Region to EU and Russian Energy Issues*” in *The Wider Black Sea Region*; p. 176. For the competing plans, see *Ibid*; p. 175.
- ⁵² *Ibid*; p. 176.
- ⁵³ Suat Kiniklioglu, “*Turkey’s Black Sea Policy*”; p. 64.
- ⁵⁴ See for instance, www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?newsid=114987 – online on 11 September 2008.
- ⁵⁵ See for instance www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?newsid=114351 – online on 3 September 2008.
- ⁵⁶ For a very sharp and focused analysis pertained to the Russian-Georgian war, see Ariel Cohen, “*The Russian-Georgian War: A challenge for the US and the world*” in *Heritage Foundation* online www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm2017.cfm - online on 11 August 2008. See also Jonathan Eyal, “*A Frozen Conflict Turns Red Hot in Georgia*” www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=S433ACCE7CB828&ref=C489C7233E0E3A – online on 12 August 2008. For the weaknesses of the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF), see *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 20 August 2008, pp. 22-23; www.ihf.com/articles/2008/09/03/europe/03georgia.php. For the weaknesses of the Land Forces in particular, see http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2008-08-22/1_uroki.html?mthree=2.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARAG	Advanced Research and Assessment Group
BBCIC	Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center
BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSSP	Black Sea Security Program
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
BTE	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
CDC	Community or Commonwealth of Democratic Choice
EDM	Eurasian Daily Monitor
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GAF	Georgian Armed Forces
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova
ICBSS	International Centre for Black Sea Studies
LRBM	long-range ballistic missile
METU	Middle East Technical University
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SAR	search and rescue
SCP	South Caucasus Pipeline, see also BTE
TESEV	Turkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etudier Vakfi/Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

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